The Concept of the Periphery as a Constitutive Part of the Capitalist World System by Elsenhans, Hartmut
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #05–2015
The category “periphery” is useful for 
describing positions in the international 
system. The analytical content however, 
is limited: Under capitalist conditions, 
overcoming “underdevelopment”/pe-
ripheral positions in the world system do 
not depend on the availability of surplus. 
Instead, overcoming “underdevelop-
ment” has been achieved by devaluation-
driven, export-oriented manufacturing, 
and therefore, by deliberately accepting 
exploitation for achieving comparative 
advantage. With regards to the MENA 
region, this “East Asian strategy” seems 
unfit because of limited capacities in 
wage goods production, especially food.
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Introduction
The center and periphery are fashionable 
concepts. They found their way from eco-
nomic geography to all disciplines of 
social, and even economic sciences. In this 
expansion, they have taken several guises, 
but have remained most often descriptive 
concepts. Their relevance in explaining 
the actual state of global structures is the 
claim that a position within the interna-
tional hierarchy determines countries’ 
possibilities for dealing with the chal-
lenges of growth, autonomy and equality—
one’s growth or “underdevelopment” are 
considered to result from this position 
within the international hierarchy. Local 
economies are ultimately shaped from 
their position in such a global system. 
The Center and Periphery as Labels
Wherever there are divisions of labor with 
products important for human life, there 
are centers and peripheries. Agriculture 
requires, as do recreational activities, large 
areas. Other activities require the close 
proximity of the producers who partici-
pate in a production chain. Cities are an 
early manifestation of the formation of 
such centers and peripheries. For long 
periods of time, it was believed that indus-
trial activities were concentrated in the 
most technically developed regions i.e. 
the core areas. However, industry increas-
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ingly migrates to “less developed” areas. 
Industries move from their coastal centers 
to the interior, as is happening in China. 
With the exception of some long-standing 
geopolitical routes, there seem to be few 
stable distributions between the roles of 
the center and the periphery. The afore-
mentioned exceptions include: The Bay of 
Bengal to the branches of the Indian 
Ocean that surround the Arabian Penin-
sula, the routes from the Indus Valley to 
the mouths of the Ganga, and the pas-
sages from central Asia to China and India. 
In nearly all of these cases, the centers are 
at the endpoints or the crossings of trad-
ing routes and are privileged as the col-
lecting points of monopoly rents—nor-
mally the regions of high agricultural 
surpluses.
Hierarchical relations are linked to politics 
and culture. The pre-capitalist city was the 
center of administration and the “domi-
nant culture”. From the city, began the 
process of state-building in the Indian 
and African contexts—even if dynasties 
had established their own cities outside 
the urban economy with its concentration 
of rising rebellious social classes. Fateh-
pur Sikri was built (late 16th century) as a 
political center in the Mughal Triangle 
(Delhi, Agra, Jaipur) but did not replace 
the commercially much more important 
cities of Agra and Delhi. By imitating the 
Asian quest for unlimited state power, the 
absolutist European monarchies dis-
placed their centers of government from 
Paris to Versailles (17th century), and from 
Berlin to Potsdam (18th century).
From the phenomena of cities dominating 
their surroundings, theories developed 
that explained inequality as the inevitable 
consequence of specialization. In the most 
diverse cultural settings, it was argued that 
solidarity of the brain and the stomach did 
not allow the stomach to revolt against the 
brain and the brain’s claim to superior 
income. Those who opposed such organic 
interpretations of the political order 
claimed that the center did not serve the 
periphery but rather exploited it and con-
tributed to its further decay. From such 
theories, the stable dichotomies between 
center and periphery are deduced.
Center and Periphery as Analytical Instru-
ments for Modeling the Dynamics of the 
Global System 
An uneven development with the continu-
ous growth of the center, and with its con-
tinued dominance over a periphery that it 
exploits, has become dominant in West-
ern and Southern interpretations of the 
global system—the result being that 
changes in this set-up are believed to 
come only from conscious modification of 
the position of a local area in the global 
unequal hierarchy.
This view is not shared by mainstream 
neoclassical economics, which expect the 
convergence of different localities. Growth 
is interpreted as the result of capital for-
mation such that an increase in the use of 
a production factor leads to diminishing 
returns. When capital is combined with 
more labor, its productivity declines. Cap-
ital will migrate from industrially more 
advanced regions, defined as regions with 
higher capital intensity of production, to 
less advanced regions where labor is still 
plentiful. The periphery is less advanced 
but is favored in its growth by the declin-
ing capital productivity in the center. The 
periphery is catching up with the center in 
economic growth and productivity. 
Although they introduce exploitation of 
the periphery by the center, Marxist theo-
ries of imperialism agree with this per-
spective. Rosa Luxemburg (286-87) 
expects capital to migrate to the not-yet-
capitalist areas, which are perceived as 
being dominated by the natural econ-
omy,1 until the natural economy is 
absorbed and capitalist relations of pro-
duction have become generalized. Lenin 
(279) shares a similar view as he assumes 
that capital in the periphery will create 
capitalist societies and technical devel-
opment and not “underdevelopment” as 
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argued later by dependency theory. In 
both theories, the periphery becomes 
transformed by being instrumentalized 
for resolving the contradictions in capital-
ist growth in the center. Ironically, it is the 
periphery that becomes developed by 
this instrumentalization.
It was only when the limits of the capital-
ist growth impact in not-yet-capitalist 
countries was diagnosed, as happened 
mainly during the 1930s Great Depres-
sion, that economic theories claimed that 
capitalism led to “underdevelopment” 
and even deepened polarization. Devel-
opment-thinking as a means of correct-
ing the spontaneous tendencies of the 
market, initially in the form of an obliga-
tion of the late colonial state, developed 
most when the national liberation move-
ments strived for their freedom subse-
quent to World War II. 
From the Indian complaints about the 
drain of India in the early 19th century to 
modern anti-imperialist discourse, there 
is continuous argumentation that the 
periphery has been blocked from devel-
opment and equality in performance in 
comparison to Europe and North Amer-
ica—those blocking factors being the 
conscious or unconscious working of 
multiple interests in the “developed” 
world, be it trade interests, financial inter-
ests through economic rents, political 
and strategic interests, etc. This dis-
course is becoming a material force in the 
“underdeveloped” world that imperialist 
powers can no longer afford to neglect.
These views became prominent in the 
wake of the economic depression of the 
1930s when the “underdeveloped” world 
was particularly hit, especially by declin-
ing terms of trade. The deteriorating 
terms of trade were only the conse-
quence of structural blockages, which 
kept the societies of the periphery from 
being able to accede to the mechanisms 
of capitalist growth—mechanisms which 
worked rather successfully in the center 
despite all their contradictions.
New theories were developed, initially by 
the nationalist Right in Europe 
(Manoïlescu), which alleged that the 
unregulated capitalist world economy 
would inflict the periphery with “under-
development” by exploitation and by 
imposing unequal specialization—a prob-
lem that the periphery could overcome 
only by gaining independence in order 
to avail itself of state power as an instru-
ment in the hands of newly rising dynamic 
national elites.
Marxist positions had to accept that their 
idea that the metropolitan working classes 
would carry out their historical mission of 
replacing capitalism by socialist revolu-
tion was misguided. Marxists in the West, 
but also in the Soviet Block, took notice of 
the nationalist revolutions in the South. 
Western Marxism, more than the Marxism 
of the Communist world movement, 
increasingly perceived in the Wretched of 
the Earth (Fanon) the new revolutionary 
subject. Capitalism had not established 
capitalist growth in the periphery, yet, a 
revolutionary subject had emerged with-
out capitalism. Marxism joined depen-
dency theory while very few Marxists 
stuck to the old idea of imperialism as a 
pioneer of capitalism (Warren). Post-war 
Marxism, World Systems theory, and 
Soviet-style Marxism converged in accept-
ing that polarization was inevitable under 
the conditions of dominance of a capital-
ist world system.
New variants of a Marxist critique of polit-
ical economy and World Systems theory 
became prominent in debates on why the 
periphery was locked into “underdevelop-
ment” under capitalist dominance. World 
Systems theory (Wallerstein, Modern 
World System I esp. 350f.) argued that 
more “developed” nations were able to 
draw resources from “less developed” 
countries and so could further their own 
development by blocking the develop-
ment of others. Thus, peripheries were 
necessary for the welfare of the centers. 
Dependency theory (Furtado; Cardoso 
and Faletto; Frank) completed this argu-
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ment: Not only is the economic depen-
dency of the peripheries favorable to the 
centers, but also in the interest of the priv-
ileged classes in those peripheries—main-
taining this dependency kept the periph-
eries from modifying their unfavorable 
relationship with the centers.
Why Do Some Countries “Develop” while 
Others Do Not?
The Arab world fits well into the theories 
that emerged to explain the locked in 
“underdevelopment” of the periphery. 
However, resource-poor countries (Singa-
pore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong), fol-
lowed by the “emerging” countries (Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, Vietnam, but also 
Mauritius or Brazil), began industrializing 
from the 1970s onward. Some of these 
newly industrialized countries achieved the 
level of technical development of the West, 
even overtaking some Western countries. 
Notably, China has become the workshop 
of the world and is ranked second among 
the world’s superpowers.
The discourse about a center and periph-
ery therefore needed to account for the 
empirical reality of overcoming “under-
development” in large tracts of the 
periphery. However, this change in dis-
course did not take into account the Arab 
world and was mostly ignored by the 
Arab world itself.
The aforementioned approaches, depen-
dency theory and World Systems theory, 
both believe in stable hierarchies, and 
insist that inequality enhances the charac-
ter of the global capitalist economy. The 
greed of capitalist enterprises pushes 
them to reduce the cost of labor and 
resources wherever possible. This allows 
for the appropriation of surplus produced 
in the periphery and its use in the center. 
This additional surplus feeds growth in the 
center and deprives the periphery of nec-
essary financial resources for investment. 
By introducing the category of the “semi-
periphery”, World Systems theory protects 
itself from being criticized by pointing at 
the emergence of industrializing countries 
in the periphery. This is a category for 
labelling economies that have to be per-
ceived as being more than exploited and 
locked in to “underdevelopment.” World 
Systems theory describes these econo-
mies as having greater resources, having 
achieved some level of technical improve-
ment, and having disposed of a coherent 
state apparatus. However, World Systems 
theory does not explain how these 
advances in overcoming “underdevelop-
ment” have been achieved either by the 
effects of the international economy or by 
the emergence of local forces of resis-
tance. In addition to exploitation of the 
periphery, Amin (172) sees the periphery 
as locked in to a system of relative prices, 
which are based on relative productivities 
in the leading industrialized countries. 
Technologies that promote production in 
the periphery are blocked because they 
are too costly in comparison to the spe-
cialization of older products. 
The appropriation of financial resources 
through rising prices for raw material 
exports on the basis of differential rents 
provided further proof that availability of 
financial resources does not necessarily 
lead to “development.” Rather, it leads to 
specialization in those products that Amin 
did not consider to be growth-promoting. 
New wealth blinded the Arab elites and 
forced them to compete for positions 
within the state apparatus. Because of self-
privileging practices, state clashes 
occurred practically everywhere and 
resulted from the disparity between the 
necessity to “develop” and the derailment 
of that initial commitment to “develop-
ment.” This rendered state classes ulti-
mately dependent on old imperialist pow-
ers for the defense of their political power.
Neither coherent states nor available 
financial resources are at the basis of 
developing the periphery. The vehicle of 
growth was export-oriented industrializa-
tion, with or without multinational corpo-
rations. When export-oriented industrial-
ization gained momentum, state 
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apparatuses emerged that no longer 
exploited their own economies for polit-
ical purposes, as strong states in the 
periphery used to do. These new types 
of state apparatuses were able to 
accompany the process of export-ori-
ented industrialization by changing the 
comparative advantage of their econo-
mies by acquiring competitiveness in 
technology-promoting branches of pro-
duction. Among these economies, the 
more successful were those who were 
able to enlarge their internal markets by 
social reforms, mainly agrarian reforms, 
which increased the incomes of large 
masses of previously impoverished rural 
populations.
There were increased real mass incomes 
and low international prices for their labor, 
which was achieved by currency devalua-
tion. This combination of increased real 
mass incomes and low labor costs was 
made possible because such exploitation 
was accepted by the exports’ countries of 
destination. The exporting countries 
added labor to their export branches, but 
simultaneously earned less for their labor 
than met the costs for survival. They there-
fore needed to be supplied with necessi-
ties from a locally produced surplus of 
wage goods. At low levels of real mass 
consumption, the share of food in house-
hold spending is high. Because of the suc-
cess of the Green Revolution in some 
countries, an increasing local surplus was 
available to feed this additional labor. Fur-
thermore, the success allowed for the mar-
ginalized poor to work on their own small 
farms for the first time.
The theory of the center and the periphery 
lost two important supportive arguments: 
Firstly, as countries accepted low prices 
for their exports, the argument regarding 
the importance of financial resources lost 
its weight. Secondly, the insistence on the 
role of the state as a major and efficient 
instrument for modifying the unfavorable 
positions imposed on some countries by 
the world system was proven equally inac-
curate. The “catching up” process did not 
imply the appropriation of surplus from 
abroad, but rather the acceptance of 
exploitation in order to enter new markets. 
The local surplus of agriculture consti-
tutes a rent and could have been taxed 
away by the government, as is common 
in oil production, and subsequently used 
for employment-creating, state-con-
trolled investment programs. Export-ori-
ented industrialization is a form of mobi-
lization of rent, as is state-financed 
spending programs (Elsenhans, Rele-
vance), however the former is safer from 
corruptive practices. 
The Arab-Mediterranean Periphery
Arab countries have been kept from pro-
ductively using oil rents. Both social and 
political discipline was lacking in the state 
classes, and therefore the rent largesse 
was not wisely appropriated and allo-
cated. Inefficiency in the realization of 
investment projects and the lack of coher-
ency in the planned industrial structure 
only intensified with increasing financial 
resources. The implications of these polit-
ical-economic models of the rent-based 
ruling classes have been discussed in 
length in the analysis of the state classes 
of the bureaucratic development societ-
ies (Elsenhans, State, Class and Develop-
ment; Ouaissa). 
The Arab world has not been able to shift 
to the strategy that was so successful in 
East Asia. Not one Arab nation opted for 
the alternative of devaluation-driven 
exports. The international price of local 
labor was higher in the Arab countries 
than in the East Asian Tiger nations. The 
nearly unlimited availability of foreign 
exchange did not make the international 
competitiveness of local labor imperative 
for the foreign exchange incomes of 
incumbent governments. Huge oil reve-
nues were distributed without simultane-
ously producing internationally competi-
tive products with local labor—that 
compulsion to be competitive was miss-
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ing. The Arab elites were, and still very 
much are, too rich to feel any necessity to 
resolve the contradiction between wealth 
and “underdevelopment” by an intelli-
gent use of rents. These oil economies are 
so rich that devaluation-driven develop-
ment is politically difficult to impose 
because the rich, as well as the poor, 
oppose it. Intellectuals indulge in pre-
Keynesian scenarios of either type: neo-
liberals are convinced that wealth creates 
development, whereas at least some 
Marxists, especially in rent-dominated 
countries, assume that fighting against 
exploitation verbally is enough. 
There is, however, an additional prob-
lem for the Arab countries. In contrast to 
East Asian countries, the Arab countries 
are food-dependent (See the contribu-
tion of Jörg Gertel in this issue). If the 
local currency devalues, imported food 
becomes more expensive. Even if this 
food is paid for by oil revenues in many 
countries, which do not decrease in the 
case of devaluation, devaluation still 
appears harmful for a country’s capacity 
to import food. 
Granted, food-dependency in the Arab 
world is an obstacle for any strategy of 
industrial diversification. The obstacle is 
not overcome even if devaluation is 
rejected: New products do not earn less 
on the world market if the exchange rate 
and the Arab international labor costs are 
lower. In reality, all Arab countries must 
enter the markets for manufactured 
goods on the basis of the low prices 
offered by the East Asian Tiger nations. 
Neither lack of competitiveness nor food-
dependency can be avoided if devalua-
tion is rejected; devaluation would pro-
tect the local market better than custom 
duties, which are always vulnerable to 
cheating and corruption. Marginalized 
labor could be hired in order to produce 
substitutes for currently imported and 
expensive goods, mass incomes in local 
currency would increase through higher 
levels of employment, and those higher 
mass incomes would contribute to launch-
ing new industries with new jobs. 
I have argued (Elsenhans, Comment 
approfondir 30) that the food problem 
could be alleviated by a European-Arab 
cooperation on the basis of concessional 
supply of European food surpluses to the 
Arab world. The success of development 
policies in the Arab world would make it a 
large market for imported food because 
the Arab world will never be able to pro-
duce enough food, at reasonable prices, 
for its current and future levels of popula-
tion. In a Mediterranean space where both 
shores contain “developed” economies, 
Europe would become the granary of the 
Arab world. In Algeria however, all my 
contributions in this direction have been 
blocked from publication since 2009. 
The dependence of the contemporary 
Arab regimes on rent becomes dramati-
cally clear when, as in 2015, world oil 
prices fall or the reserves in conventional 
oil diminish. The wealthy fight against 
devaluation in order to defend their pur-
chasing power for imported goods, even 
while it keeps the poor jobless. Redistribu-
tion of income in favor of the poor is 
blocked, which means that any locally-
supplied mass market cannot be created 
let alone increased dynamically. The poor 
however, remain ambivalent about such 
inequitable arrangements as long as they 
receive a small share of the rent. 
The appropriation of rent by the periph-
ery is not the inevitable consequence of 
the center’s interest in maintaining hierar-
chy over and deprivation of the periphery. 
It is the result of fundamental characteris-
tics of the power structure in capitalism: 
Capitalism is not maintained by the inter-
ests and behavior of the capitalist class, 
but rather capitalism is maintained by the 
pressure from the lower classes for higher 
incomes—a pressure which the lower 
classes can articulate provided they are 
empowered, normally by employment 
(Elsenhans, Kapitalismus global; Saving 
Capitalism). If there is no pressure from 
the working class to create mass con-
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sumption, outcomes are determined by 
the short-sighted interests of the capital-
ists. The “underdevelopment” of the Arab 
countries cannot be explained by resource 
transfers but rather by the greed of West-
ern capitalists, Arab rentiers, state classes 
and middle classes. However, although 
the protests of Western capitalists against 
increases in oil prices were originally 
voiced loudly, in the end, the redistribu-
tion against Western countries through 
the rise of OPEC was only mildly opposed 
by Western capitalists as it did not directly 
threaten their profits.
The Pragmatic Relevance of Center-
Periphery Dichotomies
The rise of World System Theory in the 
1960s takes its origins from the critique of 
the exploitation, especially deteriorating 
terms of trade, of the Global South. It was 
still linked to the rise of the new left, first in 
the South and later in the West. Even if not 
developed by Marxists but by Singer and 
Prebisch, the theory behind the deteriora-
tion of the situation of the Third World and 
the rise of the new left strengthened each 
other. In an effort to maintain their audi-
ence in this new emerging market for left-
ist ideas, a substantial part of economists 
attempted to rapidly integrate themselves 
into Marxism. Especially outside Paris with 
its long tradition of Marxist thinking (i.e. 
Samir Amin; Bruno Bettelheim), the result 
was the adoption of a relatively simplistic 
version of Marxism for which contributions 
in the Monthly Review could be quoted. In 
its crudest form, it took the world system 
to be a mechanism only for extracting sur-
plus from the exploited “underdeveloped” 
world. In its slightly more sophisticated 
form in the Wallerstein (The Essential 
Wallerstein 88-91) model, it required the 
periphery to be continuously exploited in 
order to maintain the center. This was 
made politically possible by some states, 
which Wallerstein coined as the semi-
periphery, that were less deprived of 
resources than the periphery.
The whole architecture of these theories 
collapses however, when it became clear 
that the periphery is neither needed for 
the sale of excess production nor as a 
source of additional surplus to maintain 
the center. Excess production disappears 
if wages increase. Increasing real wages 
do not endanger competitiveness as it is 
the exchange rate, not the bargain on real 
wages, which determines the international 
cost of an economy’s labor. The realization 
of total production (the sale of the produc-
tion including an average profit rate) 
requires only appropriate wage increases, 
a solution which Rosa Luxemburg (116) 
had excluded because she thought that 
capitalists were powerful enough to block 
real wage increases. Indeed, the capitalists 
hold such power but only for as long as 
the expansion of mass demand does not 
create high levels of employment.
As any investment finances itself, capital-
ism and capital accumulation do not 
require a periphery to be exploited in 
order to maintain the actual accumulation 
process. Profit is determined by spending 
on investment and the demand of workers 
in investment-goods production. The idea 
of unlimited accumulation, as Wallerstein 
contends (The Western Capitalism 569), is 
perhaps useful for morally discrediting 
capitalism, however, it has no basis in seri-
ous analysis of the real economy. It can 
occur only in expanding financial markets 
where money, which is without counter-
part in the real economy, is created 
through the banking system. Accumula-
tion as investment in the real economy 
cannot take place if final demand does not 
increase. The rich cannot increase their 
consumption because they risk becoming 
uncompetitive. Without outlets for their 
money in real investment, and when still 
having to use money in order to maintain 
their competitive position, they resort to 
the financial markets. The extension of the 
financial markets is itself a sign of the 
destruction of capitalism, which results 
from capitalists irresponsibly curtailing 
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final demand (Elsenhans, Die Globalisier-
ung der Finanzmärkte 528-36). 
The very small variations of the capital-
output ratio show that one description of 
capitalism does not apply: Capitalism is 
not characterized by the accumulation of 
endlessly increasing capital. In real terms, 
the value of capital does not increase in 
relation to total production and therefore 
also not in relation to total consumption. 
Capitalists essentially fight against the 
devaluation of their capital, which techni-
cal obsolescence permanently brings 
about. There is no increase in the working 
hours embodied in the stock of capital: 
Because new capital goods are produced 
by labor receiving higher real wages, 
capital stocks in industrialized countries 
normally grow in parallel with the growth 
of the real wage.
This does not exclude the “periphery” as 
being a useful concept. It allows one to 
distinguish between societies where cap-
italism works for general prosperity and 
where capitalism has penetrated societies 
from the outside thereby destroying the 
conditions for capitalism to develop. In 
the latter scenario, capitalism introduces 
some form of capitalist regulation without 
eliminating rents and the marginality of 
labor. Where I depart, is the use of “periph-
ery” as an analytical concept. The periph-
ery does not explain why capitalism 
emerges or why it grows. Economic con-
tributions of the periphery to the center 
may exist in the form of resources or mar-
kets, and may even have an impact on the 
capitalism to which they flow, but would 
be replaced by the center’s internal 
resources and sources of demand if they 
did not exist. The relation between the 
core and the periphery matters. However, 
if this relation would not exist, capitalism 
still would. The capitalist system is capable 
of overcoming its own contradictions. 
These contradictions are the consequence 
of the inexistence of a class that authorita-
tively speaks the truth about what is nec-
essary for economic development. The 
result is that the two contending main 
classes, capital and labor, develop in a 
trial-and-error process while bargaining 
on demand expansion. This simultane-
ously represents the fundamental require-
ment for further accumulation. This mech-
anism works, however, only if labor is not 
disempowered, leaving capitalism in a 
fragile state. Capitalist contradictions are 
not rooted in a deficient architecture of 
capitalism, but rather in the functional 
dependence of capitalism on the empow-
erment of labor—a dependence which 
capital permanently opposes. 
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